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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
A pharmaceutical company holding the patent on a drug 
sues the manufacturer of a generic version of that drug for 
patent infringement.  The patent-holder and the generic 
manufacturer later settle, with the former paying the latter not 
to produce a generic until the patents at issue expire.  In FTC 
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013), the Supreme Court 
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recognized that such a settlement—commonly known as a 
“reverse payment”—where large and unjustified, can 
sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of 
the antitrust laws.  To answer the antitrust question, Actavis 
explained, “it is not normally necessary to litigate patent 
validity” because “the size of the unexplained reverse payment 
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness.”  Id. 
at 2236-37.    
These two sets of consolidated appeals involve 
allegations that the companies holding the patents for Lipitor 
and Effexor XR delayed entry into the market of generic 
versions of those drugs.  The companies did so, plaintiffs say, 
by engaging in an overarching monopolistic scheme that 
involved fraudulently procuring and enforcing the underlying 
patents and then entering into a reverse-payment settlement 
agreement with a generic manufacturer.  With a single 
exception, every complaint asserts one of these 
monopolization claims against the patent-holders.  The cases 
were assigned to the same district judge, who ultimately 
dismissed the bulk of plaintiffs’ claims.   
In this opinion, we address two questions of federal 
jurisdiction.  First, do plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent 
procurement and enforcement of the patents require us to 
transfer these appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit?  That court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 
from civil actions “arising under” patent law.  28 U.S.C. § 
1295(a)(1).  But not all cases presenting questions of patent law 
necessarily arise under patent law.  See Christianson v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1986).  Where, as here, 
patent law neither creates plaintiffs’ cause of action nor is a 
necessary element to any of plaintiffs’ well-pleaded claims, 
jurisdiction lies in this Court, not the Federal Circuit. 
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The second jurisdictional question we confront is 
confined to one of the Lipitor appeals, RP Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. 14-4632.  That case, brought by a group of 
California pharmacists, involves claims solely under 
California law and was filed in California state court.  
Following removal the District Court declined to remand the 
case to state court, citing potential patent defenses.  That was 
error, as federal jurisdiction depends on the content of the 
plaintiff’s complaint, not a defendant’s possible defenses.  
Before final judgment, however, the remaining non-diverse 
defendants were voluntarily dismissed, thus raising the 
possibility that, notwithstanding the District Court’s failure to 
remand the case, it possessed diversity jurisdiction before the 
time it entered judgment.  See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 
U.S. 61 (1996).  But because the state of the record before us 
is unclear with regard to the citizenship of the parties, we 
cannot reach the merits of this appeal until that question is 
resolved.  We will accordingly remand the RP Healthcare 
appeal to the District Court so it can conduct jurisdictional 
discovery and address the matter in the first instance. 
I 
It is necessary to begin by discussing the regulatory 
framework that forms the foundation for the issues presented 
by these appeals. 
A 
“Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement 
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation, and specifically in the context of suits brought 
under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug 
manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to 
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already-
approved brand-name drug owner.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
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2227.  With the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, 98 Stat. 1585, as amended, known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress “attempted to balance the goal 
of ‘mak[ing] available more low cost generic drugs’ with the 
value of patent monopolies in incentivizing beneficial 
pharmaceutical advancement.”  King Drug Co. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2015) (alteration 
in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 
(1984)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016).  “The Act seeks to 
accomplish this purpose, in part, by encouraging 
‘manufacturers of generic drugs . . . to challenge weak or 
invalid patents on brand name drugs so consumers can enjoy 
lower drug prices.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 107-167, at 4 (2002)).  In Actavis, the Supreme Court 
identified four relevant features of Hatch-Waxman’s 
regulatory framework.  133 S. Ct. at 2227-29; see also King 
Drug, 791 F.3d at 394-96. 
First, a drug manufacturer seeking to market a new, 
“pioneer” prescription drug must obtain approval from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(b)(1).  This approval process involves testing that is “long, 
costly, and comprehensive.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.   
Second, following FDA approval of a brand-name drug, 
a generic manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) indicating that the generic “has the same 
active ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the 
brand-name drug.”  Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo 
Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(iv)).  The ANDA process furthers drug 
competition “by allowing the generic to piggy-back on the 
pioneer’s approval efforts.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.   
Third, the Hatch-Waxman Act “sets forth special 
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procedures for identifying, and resolving, related patent 
disputes.”  Id.  The new drug applicant is required to list any 
patents issued relating to the drug’s composition or methods of 
use.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).  If the FDA approves the new 
drug, it publishes this patent information, without verification, 
in its Orange Book (officially known as Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Applications).  King 
Drug, 791 F.3d at 395 & n.5 (citing Caraco, 566 U.S. at 405-
06).  In its ANDA, the generic manufacturer must “assure the 
FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the 
brand’s patents.”  Caraco, 566 U.S. at 406.  One method of 
assurance is known as “paragraph IV certification,” whereby 
the generic may assert that the relevant listed patents are 
“invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or 
sale of the [generic] drug.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).  
The filing of a paragraph IV certification “means provoking 
litigation,” Caraco, 566 U.S. at 407, as the patent statute treats 
it as an act of automatic infringement, see 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(2)(A).  If the brand-name patentee brings an 
infringement suit within 45 days, the FDA is required to 
withhold approving the generic for a 30-month period.  If the 
courts decide the matter during that period, the FDA will 
follow that determination; if not, the FDA may move forward 
on its own.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
Fourth, “Hatch-Waxman provides a special incentive 
for a generic to be the first to file an [ANDA] taking the 
paragraph IV route.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228-29.  From the 
time it begins marketing its generic, the first-filer enjoys a 180-
day exclusivity period during which no other generic can 
compete with the brand-name drug.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  This exclusivity period “can prove valuable, 
possibly ‘worth several hundred million dollars.’”  Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for 
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Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006)).  The 
right to exclusivity belongs to the first-filer alone and is 
nontransferable.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).  However, 
Hatch-Waxman does not preclude the underlying patent-holder 
from marketing a brand-generic version of its drug—known as 
an “authorized generic”—during the 180-day exclusivity 
period.  See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276-77 
(4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 
51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also King Drug, 791 F.3d at 393; 
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
B 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
reverse-payment settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context are 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.  The Court concluded that such 
settlements “can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.” 133 S. 
Ct. at 2227.  That is so, the Court held, because “[a]n 
unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally 
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s 
survival,” thus “suggest[ing] that the payment’s objective is to 
maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the 
patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have 
been a competitive market.”  Id. at 2237. 
Actavis rejected an approach known as the “scope of the 
patent” test, a near-categorical rule that “absent sham litigation 
or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement 
is immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent.”  FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 
(11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.  The 
Court concluded that it would be “incongruous to determine 
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antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive 
effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by 
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as 
well.”  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.  Instead, the Court’s 
precedents “indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both 
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—
and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by 
a patent.”  Id.  The Court viewed these cases as “seek[ing] to 
accommodate patent and antitrust policies, finding challenged 
terms and conditions unlawful unless patent law policy offsets 
the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition.”  Id. at 
2233; see id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority 
seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder 
violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took 
away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by 
a court.”).  Finally, the Court observed, among other things, 
that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to 
answer the antitrust question (unless, perhaps, to determine 
whether the patent litigation is a sham).”  Id. at 2236 (majority 
opinion).  Such antitrust questions are to be addressed under 
the traditional rule-of-reason analysis.  See id. at 2237-38. 
II 
A 
In In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 14-1402 et al., 
plaintiffs are a putative class of direct-purchasers of branded 
Lipitor, a putative class of end-payors, and four individual-
retailers asserting direct-purchaser claims.  We will refer to 
these three groups of plaintiffs collectively as the “Lipitor 
plaintiffs.”  Defendants are Pfizer Inc., Ranbaxy Inc., and their 
respective corporate affiliates; they will be referred to 
collectively as the “Lipitor defendants.”  There is also a fourth 
group of plaintiffs—several California-based pharmacists 
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raising claims under California law—that we will refer to 
independently as the “RP Healthcare plaintiffs.”  In addition 
to suing the Lipitor defendants, the RP Healthcare plaintiffs 
also named additional parties as defendants whose relevance 
we will explore in Part V, infra. 
 
1 
Warner-Lambert Co. developed atorvastatin, the active 
ingredient in its blockbuster brand-name drug Lipitor.  One of 
the best-selling pharmaceutical products of all time, Lipitor 
reduces the level of bad LDL cholesterol in the bloodstream.  
Warner-Lambert, in partnership with Pfizer, launched Lipitor 
in 1997.  The two companies merged in 2002, and we will refer 
to them collectively as “Pfizer.”   
In 1987, Pfizer obtained the original patent for Lipitor.  
That patent—designated U.S. Patent No. 4,681,893 (the ‘893 
Patent)—claims protection for atorvastatin.  Initially scheduled 
to expire in May 2006, Pfizer eventually secured extensions on 
the ‘893 Patent’s term through March 24, 2010.  Pfizer 
obtained additional, follow-on patent protection for Lipitor in 
December 1993, when the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
issued U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (the ‘995 Patent).  That patent 
claims atorvastatin calcium, the specific salt form of the active 
atorvastatin molecule in Lipitor.  The Lipitor plaintiffs assert 
that Pfizer committed fraud with regard to the procurement and 
enforcement of the ‘995 Patent.  In particular, the Lipitor 
plaintiffs allege that Pfizer submitted false and misleading data 
to the PTO to support its claim that the cholesterol-synthesis 
inhibiting activity of atorvastatin calcium was surprising and 
unexpected.  The ‘995 Patent expired on June 28, 2011.  
Following Lipitor’s 1997 launch, Pfizer obtained five 
additional patents, all of which, according to the Lipitor 
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plaintiffs, could not block further generic versions of the drug 
from coming to market.  Pfizer listed all Lipitor patents in the 
FDA’s Orange Book, with the exception of the process patents, 
which cannot be listed.  The Lipitor plaintiffs allege fraud only 
with regard to the procurement and enforcement of the ‘995 
Patent. 
After obtaining ANDA first-filer status for generic 
Lipitor in August 2002, Ranbaxy notified Pfizer of its 
paragraph IV certifications, which contended that none of the 
valid patent claims that covered Lipitor would be infringed by 
the sale, marketing, or use of its generic.  Pfizer sued Ranbaxy 
in the District Court for the District of Delaware within the 45-
day period prescribed by Hatch-Waxman, alleging that 
Ranbaxy’s generic would infringe the ‘893 and ‘995 Patents.  
Pursuant to Hatch-Waxman, the filing of Pfizer’s lawsuit 
stayed FDA approval of Ranbaxy’s ANDA for 30 months. 
After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Pfizer’s 
patents were valid and enforceable and would be infringed by 
Ranbaxy’s generic.  Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 495, 525-26 (D. Del. 2005).  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit largely agreed, affirming the district court’s ruling that 
the ‘893 Patent would be infringed.  Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy 
Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  The Federal 
Circuit reversed in part, however, holding that claim 6 of the 
‘995 Patent was invalid due to what amounted to a scrivener’s 
error in the drafting of the claim.  Id. at 1291-92.  On remand, 
the district court enjoined FDA approval of Ranbaxy’s ANDA 
until March 24, 2010, the date of the ‘893 Patent’s expiration.  
Also in response to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, Pfizer applied 
for a reissuance of the ‘995 Patent to cure the drafting error.  
Ranbaxy filed an objection to the reissuance with the PTO. 
In July 2005, as the 30-month statutory window halting 
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Ranbaxy’s generic market entry was closing, Pfizer filed a 
citizen petition with the FDA stating that the amorphous 
noncrystalline form of atorvastatin used in generic Lipitor 
(including Ranbaxy’s, as identified in its ANDA) may be 
“inferior in quality” to branded Lipitor’s crystalline form.  
Lipitor J.A. 1851.  The Lipitor plaintiffs claim that this citizen 
petition was a sham.  In May 2006, the FDA informed Pfizer 
that it had not yet reached a decision, citing the need for further 
review and analysis.  The FDA denied the petition in a 12-page 
decision issued on November 30, 2011. 
Around the same time as their Lipitor patent dispute, 
Pfizer and Ranbaxy were also locked in patent-infringement 
litigation regarding a separate drug called Accupril.  After 
Ranbaxy received ANDA approval and began marketing a 
generic Accupril product in conjunction with Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy and Teva in the District 
of New Jersey.  On March 25, 2005, the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction halting Ranbaxy’s sales of generic 
Accupril, subject to Pfizer posting a $200 million bond to cover 
Ranbaxy’s damages in the event the injunction was 
improvidently granted.  The Federal Circuit affirmed without 
prejudice to an ultimate resolution of the merits.  Pfizer Inc. v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
On June 13, 2007, in light of the disputed patent’s expiration, 
the district court vacated the preliminary injunction.  The only 
issues that remained contested were Pfizer’s limited claims for 
past damages and Ranbaxy’s counterclaim as secured by the 
preliminary injunction bond. 
In March 2008, Pfizer again sued Ranbaxy in the 
District of Delaware, this time claiming that Ranbaxy’s generic 
Lipitor would infringe Pfizer’s two Lipitor-related process 
patents.  Not long after, on June 18, 2008, Pfizer and Ranbaxy 
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publically announced that they had reached a near-global 
litigation settlement—which the Lipitor plaintiffs allege 
constituted an unlawful reverse payment—regarding scores of 
patent litigations around the world, including the Lipitor and 
Accupril disputes.  In particular, the settlement ended the 
Accupril litigation with prejudice, all domestic patent 
infringement litigation between Pfizer and Ranbaxy pertaining 
to Lipitor, and all foreign litigation between the two companies 
over Lipitor.  As a result of the settlement, Ranbaxy received a 
licensed entry date of November 30, 2011 for generic Lipitor, 
Pfizer and Ranbaxy negotiated similar market entry dates for 
generic Lipitor in several foreign jurisdictions, Ranbaxy paid 
$1 million to Pfizer in connection with the Accupril litigation, 
and Pfizer’s $200 million injunction bond from the Accupril 
litigation was cancelled.  Ranbaxy also withdrew its objection 
to the ‘995 Patent’s reissuance.  The PTO reissued the ‘995 
Patent in March 2009. 
As part of the agreement, Ranbaxy delayed entry of its 
generic to March 2010, when the ‘983 Patent was set to expire.  
Due to its ANDA first-filer status, Ranbaxy was entitled to 180 
days of market exclusivity.  The Pfizer-Ranbaxy agreement 
consequently had the effect of maintaining a bottleneck over 
the entry of generic Lipitor from later ANDA filers.  Any other 
would-be generic manufacturer that wanted the 180-day period 
to begin earlier than November 2011 would need a court to 
hold that all of Pfizer’s Orange Book-listed patents were 
invalid or not infringed.  Pfizer helped to forestall this 
possibility, the Lipitor plaintiffs say, through a combination of 
several lawsuits against subsequent ANDA filers.  The FDA 
approved Ranbaxy’s Lipitor ANDA on November 30, 2011, 
the day Ranbaxy’s license to the unexpired Lipitor patents 
commenced. 
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2 
Beginning in November 2011, the Lipitor direct-
purchasers and end-payors, as well as the RP Healthcare 
plaintiffs, filed separate antitrust actions in various federal 
jurisdictions.  The cases were referred to the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) for coordination.  In January 
2012, the RP Healthcare plaintiffs withdrew their federal suit 
and refiled in California state court raising claims solely under 
California law.  That suit was removed to federal court two 
months later.   
The JPML transferred each case to the District of New 
Jersey, and assigned the matters to Judge Peter G. Sheridan.  
See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1355 
(J.P.M.L. 2012); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 
4069565 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 3, 2012).  Thereafter, the direct-
purchaser and end-payor plaintiffs filed amended class action 
complaints; the individual-retailer plaintiffs likewise filed 
complaints joining the consolidated proceedings.  The 
complaints are substantively identical, raising the same two 
claims: First, a monopolization claim under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) or a state analogue against Pfizer, 
asserting that the company engaged in an overarching 
anticompetitive scheme that involved fraudulently procuring 
the ‘995 Patent from the PTO (Walker Process fraud), 
enforcing the ‘995 Patent and certain process patents through 
sham litigation, filing a sham citizen petition with the FDA, 
and entering into a reverse-payment settlement with Ranbaxy.  
Second, the Lipitor plaintiffs raise a claim under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) or a state analogue against 
both Pfizer and Ranbaxy, challenging the reverse-payment 
settlement as an unlawful restraint of trade.  We will refer to 
these claims, respectively, as the “section 2 monopolization 
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claim” and the “section 1 restraint of trade claim.” 
The RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ amended complaint 
raises an altogether different claim under California’s antitrust 
statute, the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et 
seq.  They allege that Pfizer, Ranbaxy, a Japanese company 
called Daiichi Sankyo (and an affiliate), and two large 
pharmacies entered into a per se unlawful market allocation 
agreement regarding Lipitor.  This agreement, according to the 
RP Healthcare plaintiffs, extended the life of Pfizer’s Lipitor-
related patents and fixed prices for Lipitor and its generic 
equivalents at supracompetitive levels.   
The Lipitor defendants filed motions to dismiss all 
complaints under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
On October 19, 2012, the District Court denied the RP 
Healthcare plaintiffs’ motion to remand to California state 
court, reasoning that “there may be many patent issues raised 
as defenses in this case which would engender federal 
jurisdiction.”  Lipitor J.A. 2.  And on May 16, 2013, the District 
Court stayed proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Actavis.  In light of Actavis, the District Court 
reopened the case and permitted the parties to file supplemental 
briefs on the pending motions to dismiss. 
On September 5, 2013, the District Court dismissed the 
Lipitor plaintiffs’ complaints to the extent they were based on 
anything other than the reverse-payment settlement.  In re 
Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 4780496 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 
2013).  In particular, the District Court rejected the Walker 
Process, sham litigation, and sham FDA citizen petition 
aspects of the Lipitor plaintiffs’ monopolization claims.  Id. at 
*15-23.  The court also granted leave to file amended 
complaints focused solely on the Pfizer-Ranbaxy reverse 
payment.  Id. at *25-27. 
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The Lipitor plaintiffs filed amended complaints in 
October 2013.  The direct-purchasers and end-payors attached 
their prior complaints as exhibits to their new complaints to 
preserve for appeal the allegations that had been dismissed.  
For their part, the independent-retailers stated in the first 
paragraph of their new complaints that they were also 
preserving the previously dismissed claims.   
In November 2013, the Lipitor defendants once again 
moved to dismiss.  On September 12, 2014, the District Court 
dismissed with prejudice the Lipitor direct-purchasers’ 
remaining argument that the Pfizer-Ranbaxy settlement was 
unlawful under Actavis.  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. 
Supp. 3d 523 (D.N.J. 2014).  The complaints of the end-payor, 
individual-retailer, and RP Healthcare plaintiffs were 
subsequently dismissed with prejudice in light of the District 
Court’s opinion. 
The direct-purchasers filed a motion to amend the 
judgment and for leave to file an amended complaint, arguing 
that the District Court applied a novel pleading standard.  That 
motion was denied on March 17, 2015.  Lipitor J.A. 151-52.  
These timely appeals followed. 
B 
In In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, Nos. 15-1184 
et al., plaintiffs are a putative class of direct-purchasers of 
branded Effexor XR, a putative class of end-payors, two 
individual third-party payors, and four individual-retailers 
asserting direct-purchaser claims.  We will refer to these 
parties collectively as the “Effexor plaintiffs.”  Defendants are 
Wyeth, Inc., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., and their 
respective corporate affiliates.  We will likewise refer to these 
parties collectively as the “Effexor defendants.”   
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1 
In 1985, the PTO issued a patent for the compound 
venlafaxine hydrochloride.  That patent was assigned to 
American Home Products, Wyeth’s predecessor.  Eight years 
later, in 1993, the FDA granted Wyeth approval to begin 
marketing Effexor, a drug used to treat major depression.  
Effexor’s active ingredient is venlafaxine hydrochloride; the 
patent for that compound expired on June 13, 2008.  In 1997, 
Wyeth introduced Effexor XR, an extended release, once-daily 
version.  Wyeth obtained three patents for Effexor XR, all of 
which expired on March 20, 2017.  The Effexor plaintiffs 
contend that Wyeth obtained the Effexor XR patents through 
fraud on the PTO, improperly listed those patents in the FDA’s 
Orange Book, and enforced those patents through serial sham 
litigation. 
On December 10, 2002, Teva filed a paragraph IV 
certification challenging the validity of Wyeth’s Effexor XR 
patents.  As the first company to file an ANDA with a 
paragraph IV certification for generic Effexor XR, Teva was 
entitled to Hatch-Waxman’s 180-day period of marketing 
exclusivity.  Wyeth brought suit against Teva for patent 
infringement in the District of New Jersey. 
In October 2005, shortly after the district court held a 
Markman hearing on claim construction, Wyeth and Teva 
reached a settlement.  Under the settlement, which the Effexor 
plaintiffs allege constitutes an unlawful reverse payment, 
Wyeth and Teva reached an agreed-upon entry date of July 1, 
2010 for generic Effexor XR, nearly seven years before the 
expiration of Wyeth’s patents related to that drug.  Wyeth 
further agreed that it would not market an authorized-generic 
Effexor XR during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity period.  In 
return, Teva would pay Wyeth royalties for the license, 
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beginning at 15% during the 180-day period.  If Wyeth chose 
not to introduce an authorized-generic after 180 days and no 
other generic entered the market, Teva was required to pay 
Wyeth 50% royalties for the next 180 days and 65% thereafter 
for up to 80 months.  Moreover, in accordance with the 
settlement, Wyeth granted Teva a license to begin selling 
generic immediate release Effexor (Effexor IR) for two years 
prior to the June 2008 expiration of the original venlafaxine 
hydrochloride patent and agreed that it would not compete with 
Teva’s marketing of generic Effexor IR during that two-year 
period.  Teva, for its part, would pay Wyeth 28% royalties 
during the first year and 20% during the second year.  
Wyeth and Teva filed the settlement agreement with the 
district court presiding over the patent infringement litigation.  
In accordance with a 2002 consent decree, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) had the right to weigh in on Wyeth’s 
settlements and to raise objections in advance.  It offered no 
objection.  The settlement was also submitted to the FTC and 
the U.S. Department of Justice pursuant to section 1112 of the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-63 
(2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note).  The district court 
thereafter entered orders vacating its prior Markman rulings, 
dismissing the case, and adopting the terms of the settlement 
as a consent decree and permanent injunction.  Effexor J.A. 
1298. 
Following the Wyeth-Teva settlement, between April 
2006 and August 2011, Wyeth brought patent infringement 
suits against sixteen other companies that sought to market a 
generic Effexor XR.  All suits settled under terms stipulating 
that Wyeth’s patents were valid and infringed. 
2 
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Beginning in May 2011, several direct-purchasers of 
Effexor XR filed class action complaints in the Southern 
District of Mississippi challenging the lawfulness of the 
Wyeth-Teva settlement agreement.  The cases were 
consolidated and, on September 21, 2011, the court transferred 
the action to the District of New Jersey. 
After transfer, the direct-purchasers filed an amended 
consolidated class action complaint, a group of end-payors 
joined the case with a consolidated class action complaint of 
their own, four individual-retailers filed complaints, and two 
individual third-party payors together filed their own 
complaint.  The complaints are substantially similar: Each 
alleges a monopolization claim against Wyeth under section 2 
of the Sherman Act or analogous state statutes, asserting that 
Wyeth fraudulently induced the PTO to issue the three patents 
covering Effexor XR (Walker Process fraud), wrongfully 
listed those patents in the Orange Book, enforced those patents 
through serial sham litigation, and entered into a reverse-
payment settlement with Teva.  The complaints also raise a 
claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act or a state analogue 
against both Wyeth and Teva, challenging the reverse-payment 
settlement as an unlawful restraint of trade.  As with the Lipitor 
appeals, we will refer to these claims, respectively, as the 
“section 2 monopolization claim” and the “section 1 restraint 
of trade claim.”  (Though otherwise similar to the other 
complaints, the individual third-party payors’ complaint names 
only Wyeth and its affiliates as defendants.  They also raise 
additional claims not relevant to these appeals.) 
The Effexor defendants filed motions to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), but the District Court stayed proceedings 
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis.  After 
Actavis was issued, the District Court vacated the stay, 
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reopened the case, and called for supplemental briefing on the 
pending motions to dismiss.  On October 23, 2013, the direct-
purchasers (but no other party) filed an amended complaint.   
On October 6, 2014, the District Court granted in part 
and denied in part the Effexor defendants’ motions to dismiss.  
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 6, 2014).  It rejected the Effexor plaintiffs’ challenges to 
the Wyeth-Teva reverse-payment settlement and dismissed 
with prejudice the section 1 restraint of trade claims.  Id. at *19-
24.  However, the District Court declined to dismiss the Effexor 
plaintiffs’ Walker Process allegations against Wyeth.  Id. at 
*24-26.  At the Effexor plaintiffs’ request, the court granted 
final judgment on the restraint of trade claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
These timely appeals followed.  On February 27, 2015, 
the Effexor defendants moved this Court to transfer the Effexor 
appeals to the Federal Circuit on the ground that the Effexor 
plaintiffs’ complaints assert claims that arise under patent law.  
We denied the motion without prejudice to the Effexor 
defendants raising the jurisdictional argument in their merits 
briefs. 
III 
The District Court possessed subject-matter 
jurisdiction, at a minimum, under the following statutes: With 
respect to the Lipitor and Effexor direct-purchasers and 
independent-retailers, the District Court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).  With respect to the Lipitor 
and Effexor end-payors, the District Court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  And with respect to the Effexor 
independent third-party payors, the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and (3).   
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The Lipitor and Effexor defendants contend that the 
District Court also had jurisdiction over each of these cases 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), thus necessitating transfer of these 
appeals to the Federal Circuit.  The RP Healthcare plaintiffs, 
for their part, argue that the District Court did not possess 
subject-matter jurisdiction at all; they say their case properly 
belongs in California state court.   
Though our jurisdiction to reach the merits of these 
appeals is disputed, “it is familiar law that a federal court 
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”  
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002); see also 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 
(1986); Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112, 116 (1834).  We 
therefore, for purposes of this opinion, have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the jurisdictional questions 
at issue is plenary.  In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 
775 F.3d 570, 576 (3d Cir. 2014). 
IV 
Like all other federal courts, we are a court of limited 
jurisdiction, possessing “only that power authorized by 
Constitution and statute.”  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  As an Article III court 
established by Congress, our appellate jurisdiction is “purely 
statutory.”  Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 428 (1910). 
The United States Courts of Appeals have general 
appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of 
the district courts of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  But 
carved out of § 1291’s jurisdictional grant is the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Congress vested that court 
with “exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision 
of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action 
arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents.”  Id. 
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§ 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The federal district courts, in 
turn, “have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising 
under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”  Id. § 1338(a).  
“Thus, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference 
to that of the district court, and turns on whether the action 
arises under federal patent law.”  Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado 
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).  So if the 
District Court here had jurisdiction over at least one claim in a 
particular case under § 1338(a), the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction of that appeal.  See Apotex, Inc. v. 
Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 19 
James Wm. Moore & George C. Pratt, Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 208.10[2], p. 208-16 (3d ed. 2017) (“The minimum 
jurisdictional requirement is the existence of at least one claim 
under the patent . . . statutes, and in a mixed case, the Federal 
Circuit has jurisdiction to decide all of the issues involved in 
the appeal.” (footnote omitted)).  In that circumstance, we 
would lack jurisdiction and be required to transfer these 
appeals to the Federal Circuit.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1631; In re 
Arunchalam, 812 F.3d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2016) (per 
curiam). 
The discussion that follows applies to both sets of 
appeals.  Consequently, unless otherwise indicated, we will 
refer to the Lipitor and Effexor plaintiffs collectively as the 
“plaintiffs” and the Lipitor and Effexor defendants collectively 
as the “defendants.” 
A 
The Supreme Court’s pathmarking decision addressing 
the Federal Circuit’s patent-law jurisdiction is Christianson v. 
Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1986).  At the 
time, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute vested that 
court with “exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final 
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decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the 
decision of a district court was based, in whole or in part, on 
[28 U.S.C.] § 1338.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).  Then, as now, § 
1338(a) granted the district courts “original jurisdiction of any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents.”  Section 1338(a) uses the same operative language as 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute that gives the district courts 
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  (Emphasis 
added.).   
Christianson held that “[l]inguistic consistency” 
requires that courts apply the same jurisdictional test to 
determine whether a case arises under § 1331 as it would under 
§ 1338(a).  486 U.S. at 808.  Under § 1338(a), then, jurisdiction 
extends “only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint 
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of 
action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends 
on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in 
that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded claims.”  Id. at 809.  As in the § 1331 context, the 
determination whether a claim “arises under” patent law must 
be made in accordance with the time-honored well-pleaded-
complaint rule.  And as “appropriately adapted to § 1338(a),” 
that rule provides that the answer to whether a claim “arises 
under” patent law “must be determined from what necessarily 
appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill 
or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or 
avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may 
interpose.”  Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)).   
For those cases in which federal patent law does not 
create the cause of action, it is not “necessarily sufficient that 
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a well-pleaded claim alleges a single theory under which 
resolution of a patent-law question is essential.” Id. at 810.  
Rather, if “‘on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are . 
. . reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes 
of [the patent laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be 
entitled to the relief it seeks,’ then the claim does not ‘arise 
under’ those laws.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26).  “Thus,” Christianson 
explained, “a claim supported by alternative theories in the 
complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction 
unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.”  Id. 
The complaint in Christianson contained an antitrust 
count that the Court understood as raising a monopolization 
claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act and a group-boycott 
claim under section 1.  See id.  Even though the claims included 
allegations of patent invalidity, the Court held that the Federal 
Circuit lacked jurisdiction because the “patent-law issue, while 
arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, 
[was] not necessary to the overall success of either claim.”  Id.   
As to the complaint’s section 2 monopolization claim, 
the Court first identified the “thrust” of the allegations, namely, 
that Colt, the defendant, “embarked on a course of conduct to 
illegally extend its monopoly position with respect to the 
described patents and to prevent” plaintiffs from competing.  
Id.  But because the well-pleaded-complaint rule “focuses on 
claims, not theories,” the Court emphasized that “just because 
an element that is essential to a particular theory might be 
governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire 
monopolization claim ‘arises under’ patent law.”  Id. at 811.  
One such theory involved allegations that certain Colt trade 
secrets were not protected under state law because their 
underlying patents were invalid.  But after parsing the 
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complaint, the Court observed that this monopolization theory 
was “only one of several, and the only one for which the patent-
law issue is even arguably essential.”  Id.  Because there were 
“‘reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes’ 
of federal patent law why [the plaintiffs] ‘may or may not be 
entitled to the relief they [sought]’ under their monopolization 
claim, the claim [did] not ‘arise under’ patent law.”  Id. at 812 
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26).   
The same result obtained with regard to the plaintiffs’ 
section 1 group-boycott claim.  That claim involved allegations 
that Colt engaged in a group-boycott to protect its trade secrets.  
And like the section 2 monopolization claim, one theory of 
recovery involved assertions that Colt’s patents protecting its 
trade secrets were invalid.  “Whether or not the patent-law 
issue was an ‘essential’ element of that group-boycott theory,” 
the Court noted, plaintiffs “could have supported their group-
boycott claim with any of several theories having nothing to do 
with the validity of Colt’s patents.”  Id. at 813.  Instead, “the 
appearance on the complaint’s face of an alternative, non-
patent theory compel[led] the conclusion that the group-
boycott claim [did] not ‘arise under’ patent law.”  Id. 
Four working principles underlie the Court’s decision in 
Christianson.  First, whether a claim “arises under” federal 
patent law is made by reference to the well-pleaded complaint.  
See Holmes Grp., 535 U.S. at 829-30.  Second, for 
jurisdictional purposes, regardless of how a complaint labels 
its claims or counts, courts are to look to the complaint and its 
allegations as a whole to identify the plaintiff’s claims and any 
theories undergirding those claims.  Third, in the antitrust 
context, courts must attend to the thrust of the plaintiff’s 
allegations and then determine the theories that explain why 
certain alleged conduct was anticompetitive.  And finally, after 
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distinguishing between claims and theories, courts then must 
ascertain whether each theory supporting a claim necessarily 
requires the resolution of a substantial question of patent law.  
If one theory does not, the Federal Circuit lacks appellate 
jurisdiction.   See ClearPlay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Christianson embraces a distinctly 
non-holistic approach to ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.  It is not 
enough that patent law issues are in the air.  Instead, resolution 
of a patent law issue must be necessary to every theory of relief 
under at least one claim in the plaintiff’s complaint.” (emphasis 
added)). 
B 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the actions 
brought by the Lipitor and Effexor plaintiffs do not “arise 
under” patent law.  We note at the outset a clear and undisputed 
aspect of our jurisdictional inquiry.  Federal and state antitrust 
law, not federal patent law, creates plaintiffs’ claims.  This 
case, like Christianson itself, turns on the second head of 
“arising under” jurisdiction.  And so we must decide whether 
plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaints state at least one claim 
upon which their “right to relief necessarily depends on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that 
patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded 
claims.”  Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809. 
Defendants do not argue that plaintiffs’ section 1 
restraint of trade claims arise under patent law.  Those claims 
relate only to the Pfizer-Ranbaxy and Wyeth-Teva reverse-
payment settlements.  Defendants instead home in on 
plaintiffs’ section 2 monopolization claims.  Recall that the 
thrust of those claims is that Pfizer and Wyeth each engaged in 
an overall scheme to monopolize the markets for their 
respective branded Lipitor and Effexor XR drugs.  Those 
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schemes, plaintiffs allege, were furthered in part by the 
companies’ fraudulent procurement and enforcement of certain 
patents relating to the drugs.  But the schemes were also 
furthered by the reverse-payment settlements (and, in the 
Lipitor appeals, the filing of a sham FDA citizen petition).  
The fraudulent procurement of a patent—known as 
Walker Process fraud, see Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food 
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (recognizing that 
a patentee’s knowing and willful misrepresentation of facts to 
the PTO can strip the patentee of immunity under the antitrust 
laws)—requires a plaintiff to show, among other things, that 
the patentee committed fraud before the PTO, that the fraud 
caused the patent to issue, and that the patentee enforced the 
fraudulently procured patent, Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006).  Walker Process 
fraud has for some time been considered by courts to present a 
substantial question of patent law.  See In re DDAVP Antitrust 
Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Ciprofloxacin 
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he determination of fraud before the PTO necessarily 
involves a substantial question of patent law.”); Nobelpharma 
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (en banc in relevant part) (“[W]hether conduct in 
procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee 
of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a 
question of Federal Circuit law.”).  And to the extent plaintiffs’ 
sham litigation and false Orange Book listing theories depend 
on a successful showing of Walker Process fraud, they too 
could present substantial questions of patent law.  See DDAVP, 
585 F.3d at 685; Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071-72.  We 
recognize as well that the substantiality of these theories may 
be open to debate following Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 
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(2013).  That case held, in the context of a state legal 
malpractice claim, that hypothetical, backward-looking, case-
within-a-case questions of patent law that do not change the 
real-world result of prior federal patent litigation do not present 
a substantial patent-law issue.  Id. at 1067-68.  We need not 
definitively address the substantiality of plaintiffs’ Walker 
Process, sham litigation, and false Orange Book listing 
theories in light of Gunn.  For even assuming that these theories 
do present substantial questions of patent law, plaintiffs’ right 
to relief on their section 2 monopolization claims does not 
depend upon them. 
Here, plaintiffs could obtain relief on their section 2 
monopolization claims by prevailing on an alternative, non-
patent-law theory, namely, that Pfizer and Wyeth monopolized 
the market in their respective branded drugs by engaging in a 
reverse-payment settlement.  And in Lipitor the plaintiffs could 
also prevail on the additional non-patent law theory that Pfizer 
filed a sham citizen petition with the FDA.  See DDAVP, 585 
F.3d at 686 (“[W]hether [a FDA] petition was a sham is an 
issue independent of patent law.”); see also Apotex Inc. v. 
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2016).   
Actavis teaches that reverse-payment antitrust claims do 
not present a question of patent law.  See 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37 
(“[T]he size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a 
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing 
a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the 
patent itself.”).  The Court did acknowledge, however, that 
questions of patent validity may still arise from time to time.  
See id. at 2236 (“[I]t is normally not necessary to litigate patent 
validity to answer the antitrust question (unless, perhaps, to 
determine whether the patent litigation is a sham).”).  But even 
where patent-law questions are presented, it does not follow 
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that patent law is necessary for relief on every theory of 
liability supporting an antitrust claim.  In the present appeals, 
“[s]ince there are reasons completely unrelated to the 
provisions and purposes of federal patent law why [plaintiffs] 
may or may not be entitled to the relief they seek under their 
monopolization claim, the claim does not ‘arise under’ federal 
patent law.”  Christianson, 486 U.S. at 812 (brackets, citation, 
and some internal quotation marks omitted).  These 
considerations lead us to conclude that the presence of non-
patent-law theories of liability supporting the Lipitor and 
Effexor plaintiffs’ monopolization claims vests jurisdiction 
over their appeals in this Court, not the Federal Circuit.    
C 
Defendants do not quarrel with any of the principles that 
guide our analysis.  They instead assert that plaintiffs’ reverse-
payment settlement allegations constitute monopolization 
claims separate and apart from the Walker Process fraud, sham 
litigation, and false Orange Book listing theories.  The 
allegations of fraudulent procurement and enforcement of the 
Lipitor and Effexor patents, in defendants’ view, involve 
distinct anticompetitive conduct that occurred years before the 
reverse-payment settlements (and, in Lipitor, the sham FDA 
citizen petition). 
We reject this divide-and-conquer approach to “arising 
under” jurisdiction.  Defendants in effect ask that we rewrite 
plaintiffs’ complaints, which plead patent-law related theories 
as aspects of an overall monopolistic scheme.  A 
monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act has 
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of that power.  LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
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U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).  But to be condemned as 
exclusionary, a monopolist’s anticompetitive conduct must 
have an anticompetitive effect.  “The relevant inquiry,” we 
have held, “is the anticompetitive effect of [a defendant’s] 
exclusionary practices considered together.”  Id. at 162.  Thus, 
“courts must look to the monopolist’s conduct taken as a whole 
rather than considering each aspect in isolation.”  Id. (citing 
Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 
690, 699 (1962)); see id. (“[I]t would not be proper to focus on 
specific individual acts of an accused monopolist while 
refusing to consider their overall combined effect . . . .  We are 
dealing with what has been called the ‘synergistic effect’ of the 
mixture of the elements.” (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
Defendants contend that the patent-law theories of 
monopolization liability in plaintiffs’ complaints are distinct 
“claims.”  But that runs headlong into traditional antitrust 
principles.  Plaintiffs’ monopolization claims encompass the 
totality of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct—from 
defendants’ fraudulent procurement and enforcement of their 
patents on through to the reverse-payment settlements.  We 
will not permit the defendants to commandeer these 
complaints, of which plaintiffs are master. 
Nor do we accept the argument that certain statements 
made by the Effexor plaintiffs in the District Court somehow 
estop them from arguing that the patent-law allegations 
constitute theories of relief.  Principles of estoppel cannot 
confer jurisdiction where it otherwise does not exist.  See Ins. 
Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 247 
(3d Cir. 2014).  And in any event, our jurisdictional inquiry is 
confined solely to the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaints, not 
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subsequent events.  See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814 (“Since 
the district court’s jurisdiction is determined by reference to 
the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case, the referent 
for the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction must be the same.”). 
D 
Our jurisdictional holding is consistent, we think, with 
two of the Second Circuit’s pre-Actavis reverse-payment cases.  
In one case, the court transferred an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit and retained jurisdiction over others.  The Second 
Circuit explained: “The indirect purchaser plaintiffs amended 
their complaint to add state-law, Walker Process antitrust 
claims . . . .  Because the Walker Process claims are preempted 
by patent law, we transferred the indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, while retaining jurisdiction over 
the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ appeals.”  Arkansas Carpenters 
Health & Welfare v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 103 n.10 (2d Cir. 
2010); see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 30732, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2007) 
(order transferring indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ appeal to the 
Federal Circuit).  The Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit 
therefore each independently assessed the lawfulness of the 
same reverse-payment settlement.  See Arkansas Carpenters, 
604 F.3d at 103 & n.10; Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333.  But 
unlike the Lipitor and Effexor appeals before us, the appeal 
transferred from the Second Circuit to the Federal Circuit 
involved stand-alone Walker Process claims.  See In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]ndirect plaintiffs’ Count V 
[raising state-law Walker Process claims] not only arises out 
of patent law, but rests entirely on patent law” (emphasis 
added)), aff’d, 544 F.3d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and aff’d sub 
nom. Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d 98.   
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And in DDAVP, 585 F.3d 677, the Second Circuit 
retained jurisdiction over a reverse-payment case.  The 
DDAVP plaintiffs alleged four theories of liability in a 
Sherman Act monopolization claim against a branded drug 
manufacturer based upon theories nearly identical to those the 
Lipitor and Effexor plaintiffs bring against Pfizer and Wyeth: 
Walker Process fraud, sham Orange Book listing, sham 
litigation against generic competitors, and a sham FDA citizen 
petition.  Id. at 685.  The Second Circuit acknowledged that, 
while the plaintiffs’ first three theories turned on substantial 
questions of patent law, the fourth theory—the filing of a sham 
FDA citizen petition—did not.  Id. at 685-86.  Because the 
citizen-petition theory did not raise any question of patent law, 
the court exercised jurisdiction over the entirety of the 
plaintiffs’ monopolization claim.  Id. at 686. 
A final, prudential consideration tips in favor of our 
Court exercising jurisdiction over these appeals.  Under the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rules, it would apply Third 
Circuit antitrust jurisprudence—including our recent decision 
in King Drug, 791 F.3d 388—when reviewing whether 
plaintiffs’ complaints state plausible claims for relief under 
Actavis.  See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1059 (Federal Circuit 
“appl[ies] the law of the appropriate regional circuit to issues 
involving other elements of antitrust law such as relevant 
market, market power, damages, etc., as those issues are not 
unique to patent law”).  Now that the Supreme Court has 
confirmed that it is usually unnecessary to litigate these patent-
law issues to determine antitrust liability, the development of 
post-Actavis jurisprudence is, in the ordinary case, left to the 
regional Courts of Appeals. 
Christianson establishes that not all cases involving 
patent law fall within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.  
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Congress has left a role for our Court to play in adjudicating 
patent-law issues over which we possess jurisdiction.  Our 
holding requires us to fulfill that role in these appeals. 
V 
The appeal of the RP Healthcare plaintiffs requires a 
separate jurisdictional inquiry.  That case was filed by a group 
of California pharmacists in the Superior Court of California, 
Sonoma County, but Pfizer removed it to federal district court, 
citing federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
patent-law jurisdiction under § 1338(a).  RP Healthcare J.A. 
26-27; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  In denying the RP Healthcare 
plaintiffs’ remand motion, the District Court reasoned that 
“there may be patent issues raised as defenses in this case 
which would engender jurisdiction.”  Lipitor J.A. 2.  We 
disagree.  “Under the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . whether 
a claim ‘arises under’ patent law ‘must be determined from 
what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own 
claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in 
anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the 
defendant may interpose.’”  Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8); see Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1914); N.J. 
Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 
302 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The existence or expectation of a federal 
defense is insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.”).   
Pfizer and Ranbaxy nevertheless argue that the RP 
Healthcare case belongs in federal court because it “arises 
under” patent law pursuant to § 1338(a).  They also say the 
District Court possessed diversity jurisdiction before final 
judgment entered as a result of the RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ 
voluntary dismissal of the only two non-diverse defendants.  
We reject the first argument but find the record insufficient to 
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decide the second. 
A 
 The RP Healthcare plaintiffs do not challenge the 
Pfizer-Ranbaxy settlement as an unlawful reverse payment.  
Rather, they allege that the settlement constitutes a per se 
unlawful market allocation agreement in violation of 
California’s Cartwright Act.  Two years after Actavis, the 
California Supreme Court held that reverse-payment 
settlements can be challenged under that Act and are to be 
analyzed under a structured rule-of-reason.  In re Cipro Cases 
I & II, 348 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2015).  But the California court has 
yet to recognize the kind of per se market allocation claim 
proposed by the RP Healthcare plaintiffs. 
To the extent their claim exists under California law (a 
question we do not decide), as pled by the RP Healthcare 
plaintiffs that claim would not “arise under” federal patent law.  
Pfizer and Ranbaxy latch onto a single sentence in the RP 
Healthcare plaintiffs’ state court complaint making an express 
allegation of Walker Process fraud.  See RP Healthcare Pls.’ 
Compl. ¶ 114, RP Healthcare J.A. 57 (“The Agreement 
between Defendants extending the length of the Lipitor patents 
constitutes fraudulent procurement and enforcement of a patent 
. . . .” (citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172)).  But like the 
complaints of the Lipitor and Effexor plaintiffs discussed 
above, we conclude that there are alternative non-patent-law 
theories through which the RP Healthcare plaintiffs could 
prevail on their state-law antitrust claim.  See Christianson, 
486 U.S. at 809-10.  The RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ complaint 
includes theories of liability other than Walker Process fraud.  
See id. ¶ 105, RP Healthcare J.A. 56 (“The Agreements 
between the Defendants, which artificially extended the length 
of the Lipitor-related patents, allocated markets between them, 
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artificially postponed price reductions, and restrained trade in 
the provision of Lipitor and its generic alternatives, are a 
violation of the Cartwright Act . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Thus, 
the RP Healthcare plaintiffs could obtain relief on the market 
allocation claim all without addressing the validity of Pfizer’s 
Lipitor patents.  The oblique mention of Walker Process fraud 
in their complaint does not land this case in the “special and 
small category” of state-law claims “in which arising under 
jurisdiction still lies.”  Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
B 
While the District Court did not possess jurisdiction 
over the RP Healthcare case under § 1338(a), the possibility 
exists that the court had diversity jurisdiction by the time it 
entered final judgment.  Article III of the Constitution provides 
that “[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . 
. to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States; . . . 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.”  Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, Congress has authorized the 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction based on the parties’ 
diversity of citizenship.  In its current form, the diversity 
statute vests in the federal district courts original jurisdiction 
of “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds 
the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . . citizens of 
different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state are additional parties.”  28 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  Since 
Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity statute to require 
“complete diversity” of citizenship: “[i]n a case with multiple 
plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of 
a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant 
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deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over 
the entire action,” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allahpattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). 
Though “[i]t had long been the case that ‘the jurisdiction 
of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the 
action brought,’” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 
541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)), this time-of-filing rule is subject 
to a few discrete exceptions.  One such “method of curing a 
jurisdictional defect [that has] long been an exception to the 
time-of-filing rule” is when a jurisdictional defect is “cured by 
the dismissal of the party that had destroyed diversity.”  Id. at 
572.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Lewis, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case 
improperly removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if 
federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time 
judgment is entered.”  529 U.S. 61, 64 (1996).   
Pfizer and Ranbaxy urge us to apply that exception here.  
After all, the RP Healthcare plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 
the only two non-diverse defendants prior to entry of final 
judgment.  Before this Court, however, the parties expressed 
uncertainty regarding the state of the record as it pertains to the 
citizenship of two parties—defendants Pfizer Ireland 
Pharmaceuticals and Warner-Lambert Co., LLC, both 
unincorporated entities and wholly owned subsidiaries of 
Pfizer.  See Lipitor Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-24, 44-47; RP 
Healthcare Pls.’ Reply Br. 17-18.  Like all unincorporated 
entities, partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs) 
bear the citizenship of each of their members.  See Americold 
Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016-17 
(2016); Carden v. Arcoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 
(1990); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 
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420 (3d Cir. 2010).   
As the parties asserting diversity jurisdiction, Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy bear the burden of proving diversity of citizenship by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  See Freidrich v. Davis, 767 
F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2014).  Since this case was removed to 
federal court, diversity must have existed both at the time the 
RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ state court complaint was filed and 
at the time of removal.  See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 
534, 537 (1939); Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 
F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013).  But no changes in citizenship 
after the time of filing (and, as relevant here, the time of 
removal) can create or destroy diversity.  See Grupo Dataflux, 
541 U.S. at 574-75; Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556, 
565 (1829).   
In calling for diversity jurisdiction Pfizer and Ranbaxy 
made no effort before this Court or the District Court to 
demonstrate that complete diversity was in fact present before 
final judgment.  That is especially puzzling, since an 
unincorporated association “is in the best position to ascertain 
its own membership,” Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, 
LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2015), and the entities in 
question are Pfizer subsidiaries.  While we have previously 
observed that, “where the unincorporated association is the 
proponent of diversity jurisdiction, there is no reason to excuse 
it of its obligation to plead the citizenship of each of its 
members,” id. at 108 n.36, that statement was made in the 
context of an unincorporated association asserting diversity as 
a plaintiff.  It does not address the situation in this case, where 
the removing parties are asserting diversity as a result of the 
plaintiffs’ own voluntary post-removal actions.  We therefore 
consider it premature to direct that the RP Healthcare case be 
sent back to California state court.  Rather, we will remand the 
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matter to the District Court to give the parties the opportunity 
to clarify the record with regard to diversity of citizenship.  The 
District Court should also ensure that the amount in 
controversy alleged in the RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ state-court 
complaint exceeds $75,000.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Angus 
v. Shiley, 989 F.2d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Our remand applies as well to the Daiichi Sankyo 
defendants.  Before the District Court, they moved to dismiss 
the RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ complaint on three grounds: lack 
of Article III standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The District 
Court dismissed the Daiichi Sankyo defendants under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible claim.  Lipitor J.A. 65, 
3543-44.  But “a federal court generally may not rule on the 
merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction 
over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) 
and the parties (personal jurisdiction).”  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007); 
see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 
93-102 (1998).  The District Court should have resolved the 
standing and personal jurisdictional arguments before 
dismissing Daiichi Sankyo on the merits.  In the event that the 
District Court concludes on remand that the parties were 
completely diverse at the time of judgment, it should address 
those arguments to determine whether it had the power to reach 
the merits of the RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ claim against 
Daiichi Sankyo.   
It is a common practice among the Courts of Appeals to 
retain jurisdiction over an appeal while making a limited 
remand for additional findings or explanations.  Basic 
illustrations include a “controlled remand to determine whether 
there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction,” as well as 
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“remands to determine justiciability or personal jurisdiction.”  
16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3937.1, pp. 847-48 
(3d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Friery v. Los 
Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 
2006) (limited remand for Article III standing determination); 
Fort Knox Music Inc. v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 
2000) (limited remand for personal jurisdiction determination); 
Jason’s Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 
189, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1985) (limited remand for diversity-of-
citizenship determination).  We will follow that practice and 
retain jurisdiction over the RP Healthcare plaintiffs’ appeal.  It 
is expected that the District Court and the parties will move 
expeditiously on remand to resolve the diversity-of-citizenship 
issue and, if necessary, jurisdiction over the Daiichi Sankyo 
defendants. 
VI 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that, with a single 
exception, we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of these 
appeals.  In one of the Lipitor appeals, RP Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. 14-4632, because it is unclear whether the 
District Court had jurisdiction at the time judgment was 
entered, we will order a limited remand for the parties to clarify 
the record in this regard.  Any further proceedings in these 
appeals will be heard by this panel. 
